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As to cases which the law seems unable to determine * 9 9 the law appoints
officials and leaves such matters to them to determine to the best of their judg-
ment. - Aristotle.
From time immemorial many public officers have exercised licensing, rule-
making, and adjudicatory powers over many kinds of human undertakings. And
at all times much of the procedure by which governments are carried on has been
administrative or executive. In pre-Parliamentary England there was a period
when all the functions of the state were exercised by the King with the assistance
of the Curia Regis, in the collection and management of the royal revenues, the
administration of justice to suitors and the despatch of all public business.'
But, as and when the English political system took a turn from feudalism towards
constitutionalism, the dominant classes slowly but persistently directed their at-
tention to the urgent need of apportioning governmental powers among re-
sponsible officials, and thus laid the foundation of modern administrative law.
This was effected through various devices such as royal ordinances, royal instruc-
tions, orders in council, and eventually by means of acts of parliament.2
The most famous administrative officials in the history of English Law and in-
stitutions are the justices of the peace originally known as "conservators of the
peace." They are statutory officers possessed of no traditional or common law
powers, as noted in that scholarly work, Jenks' Short History of the Common
Law.8 Their duties have been numerous and diversified, from time to time,
and at various periods have included such responsibilities as, settling questions
lHallam, The Middle Ages, chapter viii, part ii; McKean, Canon Law in American Jurisdic.
tions, 39 Dickinson Law Review 75, 85 (1935).
2Among the institutions which originated within the Curia Regis, was that of equity, which
in its early days of administrative power, invented the prerogative writs of common law. McKean,
Canon Law in American Jurisdictions, 39 Dickinson Law Review 75, 85 (1935).
82d. ed., 1922, p. 153.
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of order, roads and bridges, prices and wages, the fixation of rates to be charged
by common carriers, and the promotion of the welfare of the poor. Many public-
spirited men, of whom I need only mention many-sided George Washington,
have been valuable members of "the minor fudidary."
AUTHORITY
In our American system of jurisprudence, statutory limitations are largely
questions of interpretation, while constituitional limitations are usually questions
of power. In England the "High Court of Parliament" has absolute power. In
American jurisdictions the sway of the legislative department of government is
supreme, except insofar as it may be limited, restrained or controlled by organic
law. On the general subject of power, Sir William Holdsworth's pointed observa-
tions may be quoted at this juncture. They are as follows: The existence or non-
existence of a power or duty, is a matter of law and not of fact, and so must
be determined by reference to some enactment or reported case.4 Similarly
it is firmly established that the existence or non-existence of jurisdictional facts
raises a question of law. It follows that an administrative conclusion which raises
a question of legal power, is re-examinable by legal tribunals as a problem in
the determination of jurisdictional facts; a proposition laid down by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. 5 Furthermore, a decision by an American legislature
or administrative bodyon a question of fact is not conclusive upon a court where
the power of such legislative or administrative body is challenged.6 In other
words, the power of an administrative body to act or not to act is a judicial
question,7 and, all things considered, administrative tribunals are on the footing
of courts of special jurisdiction. Hence their authority is not presumed but must
be shown by those claiming rights under their acts; as was settled over a century
ago in the case of Lowrey v. Erwin.8 Practically all administrative authority d-
rives from statutory enactment;9 and it is elementary that a statute has three
parts, viz. declaratory, directory and vindicatory. Standards and other limitations
of administrative power are directory; and their fixation is legislative and non-
delegable.10
46 Halsbury, Laws of England, 379 (2d ed. 1932). United States v. Joint Traffic Association,
171 U. S. 505, 573 (1898). accord.
5216 U. S. 538 (1910).
6Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920) ; People ex tel. Con-
solidated Water Co. v. Maltbie, 275 N. Y. 357 (1937).7 lnterstate Commerce Commission v. Humboldt Steamship Co., 224 U. S. 474 (1912).
86 Robinson 192 (La. 1843).
9People v. Public Service Commission, 171 App. Div. 810 (N. Y. 1916); Chippewa Power
Co. v. Railroad Commission, 188 Wis. 246, (1925).
'0 Compare: Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); O'Neil v. Insurance Co., 166 U. S. 72 (1895); Holgate




Subject to restrictions imposed by constitutional limitations, a legislature
has power to determine how rights which it creates shall be enforced." What is
to be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of the authority delegated, are
factors to be determined by the law-enacting power; and such statutory provisions
do not amount to a shifting of responsibility by a legislative body, if it sets up
reasonable and workable standards for the agency selected by it to carry out its
commands." This would be obvious if we paused to consider that an attempted
delegation of power to make the law is unconstitutional, in that it necessarily
involves discretion to decide what the law should be. 18 Indeed, no American
legislature, existing under a tripartite scheme of government such as that which
obtains under our Federal constitution, has any authority to abdicate or transfer
to any one, the primary functions with which it has been vested by fundamental
law. 14 The saroe principle obtains in England where "an extensive delegation
of legislative power would not be tolerated."' 15 This non-delegability of primary
or predominant legislative power and responsibility, was forcibly illustrated by
the fate of the historic "Blue Eagle Statute."' 16 The basic.principle of preclud-
ing legislative shifting of responsibility, just referred to, is an outstanding char-
acteristic of common law jurisdictions. Indeed this fundamental doctrine of
English law and its derivatives, is in marked contrast to that which prevailed in
the ancient Roman imperial system wherein the Senate surrdndered its legislative
powers to the chief executive; a practice which gave rise to the celebrated maxim
of the civil law, Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem. At the same time it
is worthy of observation that delegation by law-enacting bodies of such second-
ary powers as are subordinate or auxiliary is not opposed to the practice and spirit
of our system of jurisprudence. Accordingly the Middle English prefix "quasi"
(as if, or about) should always be implied when analyzing cases which employ
the terms "legislative" or "judicial" in the course of discussing the legal powers
of administrative bodies. The primary (hence not delegable) functions of legis-
llSwitchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation Board 64 S. Ct. 195 (1943);
Commonwealth v. Stofchek, 322 Pa. 513 (1936).
"2People v. Public Service Commission, 17f App. Div., 810 (N. Y. 1916); Swarthmore v.
Public Service Commission, 277 Pa. 472 (1923); Citizens Passenger Ry. Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, 271 Pa. 39 (1921); Chippewa Power Co. v. Railroad Commission, 188 Wis. 246 (1925).
13Zakus v. United States, 64 S. Ct. 660 (1944) ; Bowles v. Willington, 64 S. Ct. 641 (1944) ;
Nebbia v, New York, 291 U. S; 502 (1934); People v. Barnett, 344 II. 627 (1931); Rohrer v.
Milk Control Board, 322 Pa. 257 (1936); Commonwealth v. Benn, 284 Pa. 421 (1925).
14Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1 (1939); State v. Great Northern Ry., 100 Minn. 445, 111
N. W. 289 (1907).
lllbert, Legislative Methods and Forms, 38 (1911).
1
6
Schechter Poultry Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 495 (1935).
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lative power comprise law-making, policy-making and taxation;" but law re-
ports and textbooks, to say nothing of notes and articles in legal periodicals,
show that it is not always easy to differentiate between legislative and admin-
istrative power. This difficulty has been well phrased by the Supreme Court of the
United States, as follows:
"While administration and legislation are quite distinct powers the line
which separates exactly their exercise is not tasy to define in words. It is best
recognized in illustrations. Undoubtedly the legislature must declare the policy
of the law, and fix the legal principles which are to control in given cases, but
an administrative body may be invested with the power to ascertain the facts
and conditions to which the policy and principles apply. If this could not be
done there would be infinite confusion in the laws and in an effort to detail
and particularize, they would miss sufficiency both in provision and execution." 18
The sum and substance of this is that administration consist in the appli-
-cation of legal principles to situations of pertinent facts. As previously noted,
administrative functions are either quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial as occasion
may arise for their application. The quasi-legislative function involves intra vires
filling up of necessary details of the primary standards fixed by statutory enact-
ment. This is best effected by prescribing administrative rules and regulations.
On the other'hand, the quasi-judicial function is adjudicatory in character, and
has to do with such matters as applications for permits, licensing or the renewal
or alteration of licenses, and, in general, administrative findings and decisions
upon such non-governmental activities deemed to be impressed with a public
interest, as may properly come before them in the performance of their official
duties. It is important that the exeicise of quasi-legislative functions be consistent
with and not opposed to the requirements or policy of statutory authority. It is
likewise of equal importance, that in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions,
administrative bodies should meet the requirements of due process and avoid
the evils of abuse of discretion. Very often the standards set by the legislature
for the guidance of administrative bodies are set forth in exceedingly compressed
phraseology, as in the concised terms, "fair and equitable", "public necessity and
convenience", "just and reasonable."
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
The proposition that a court cannot assume to substitute its discretion or
notions of wisdom and expediency for the discretion of administrative or legis-
l'7Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United
States, 216 U. S. 177 (1920); State v. Travellers Ins. Co., 13 Conn. 255 (1900) ; State v. Young,
9 N. W. 737 (Minn. 1881) ; West Jersey & Seashore Ry. Co. v. Public Utility Board, 87 N. J. L.
170 (1915); Mundy v. Rahway, 43 N. J. L. 333 (1885); Wilson v. Philadelphia School District,
328 Pa. 225 (1937); Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491 (1873); State v. Whitney, 196 Wis. 472, 505
(1928).
ISMutual Film Corp. v. Commission, 236 U. S. 230 (1915).
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lative bodies, is almost elementary.19 As a corollary to this clear-cut legal prin-
cipl'e, we find it authoritatively adjudged that an unabused exercise of admin-
istrative discretion in the discharge of lawfully delegated powers is deemed to be
non-justiciable.2 0 Further than this it would seem that the rule that questions of
law arising in administrative proceedings are-reviewabte by the courts 1 is a prin-
ciple having a tendency to be found unworkable, and necessarily inapplicable,
wherever the solution of such problems hinges upon the employment of technical
knowledge or administrative discretion.22  Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.
It is almost a commonplace in the science of nomology, that law is not divisible
into water-tight compartments. Take for example the numerous occasions where
the student comes across a ruling case universally recognized as an authority
for a variety of rules of law. On the other hand, consider how many legal
principles graduate into each other and thus add to the complexity of jural
problems. These observations seem particularly applicable to the subject-matter
of this article. In dealing with questions of administrative discretion very help-
ful suggestions have been made by Dr. Fritz M. Marx, who sets forth that
"administrative discretion operates solely within the framework of its authoriza-
tion. Each administrative act to be lawful must maintain a discernible nexus
with the general norm conferring the discretionary power. The existence of such
a nexus is in itself a question of law. In this criterion alone lies the distinction
between lawful exercise of discretionary power and arbitrariness. '" 2 The plain
meaning of all this is that administrative discretion is not a subject of judicial
control. In the lucid phraseology of the House of Lords, exercising a discretion
upon considerations of policy and practical good sense, and of course with
honesty, is acting administratively.
1
4
19St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 51 (1936); Florida v. United
States, 292 U. S. 1 (1934); Gas Company v. McCall, 245 U. S. 345 (1917); Wallace v. Feehan
206 Ind. 522 (1934); Campbell v. New York City, 244 N. Y. 317 (1925).
For discussion of the analogous topic of political discretion, see: Dodd, Judicially Non-en-
forcible Provisions of the Constitution, 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 54 (1931); McKean, Border Lines of
Judicial Power, 48 Dickinson Law Rev. 1, 9 (1943).
20Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co. 289 U. S. 206 (1933);
Virginian Ry. v. United States, 272 U. S. 658 (1926); Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall. 347 (U. S.
1868); Water Works v. San Francisco, 82 Calif. 286, 314 (1890); Borgnis v. Falk, 147 Wis. 327
(1910); McKean, op. cited supra, n. (20) pp. 1, 11, 19.2 1Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 308 U. S. 39, 52 (1939) ; Perkins v.
Ely, 307 U. S. 325 (1929). With reference to questions of law, it may be noted that it is cus-
tomary for courts to regard blended questions of law and fact, as issues of fact. See: Marqueza v.
Frisbie, 101 U. S. (1879); Eaglesfield v. Marquis of Londonderry, 4 Ch. D. 693 (Eng. 1876);
Thomas v. The King (1938) The Argus Law Reports 37 (Australia). '2 2Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 290 U. S. 127 (1933); Williams v.
United States, 281 U. S. 206 (1930) ; United States v. Lane, 250 U. S. 549 (1919) ; Interstate Com-
merce Commission v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 222 U. S. 541 (1912); Provident Savings Life Assur-
ance Soc. of New York v. Cutting, 131 Mass. 261 (1902).2 3Comparative Administrative Law, 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 954, 961 (1939).
24Leeds v. Ryder, (1907) A. C. 420, 423 (Eng. H. L.).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
PROCEDURE
History teaches that the "law of the Land" of Magna Carta, no less than the
"due process of law," of American constitutional law, contemplates administra-
tive procedure as well as judicial procedure. It follows, of necessity, that the
basic requirements of this due process of law or law of the land, is the effective
restraint of governmental activity of all sorts and descriptions, whether legisla-
tive, executive, judicial or administrative, to a due observance of the fundamental
rights of individual liberty and private property.25 In the words of a great
authority on the English law of his day, "Nothing better becomes authority than
that it should live by the law."26 It has been judicially determined, conformably
to this ancient principle, that the decisions of executive or administrative officers,
acting within the limits of powers expressly conferred upon them by law, are
due process of law.27 Furthermore, in the words of a famous exponent of
American constitutional law, the learned Mr. Justice Cooley, "administrative pro-
cess of the customary sort is as much due process of law as judicial process."
2
Procedure, the machinery of administrative activity rathler than its product, may
be either summary or audient. Wherever summary action is legitimately called
for, by the nature of the subject-matter, no preliminary hearing before a particu-
lar board or official is requisite. This universally accepted principle of govern-
mental procedure is obviously an outgrowth of the fundamental law of neces-
sity, and is illustrative of the workings of the familiar maxim, salus populi
suprema lex. It is especially applicable in cases of public jeopardy such as
threatened plague, pestilence or famine, where speedy precautionary action is of
the essence of urgent or invincible necessity. Likewise, though to a lesser degree
of necessity, there is an imperative necessity for expeditious administration of
the tax power, a function which is unquestionably of vital importance to the
maintenance of governmental efficiency. Briefly stated official summary action
is lawful when actuated by the requirements of urgent public need. It must
not be overlooked however, that the legality of such drastic measures may be
tested by, subsequent judicial review.29 But wherever timeliness is of the essence
of efficient protection of a community against impending danger or apprehended
disaster, such measures as may be taken for coping with imminent emergencies
will be approved by the courts except for very cogent reasons. In their very
nature administrative hearings are on a very different footing from that of sum-
mary proceedings. Whenever a legislature creates an administrative body to
25Public Service Commission v. Great Northern Utilities Co., 289 U. S. 130 (1939) ; Ownebet
v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 44, 110, Ill (1921).2 6 Bracton, De legibus, xvi sec. 9.2 7Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U. S. 86, 98 (1903).2 8Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201, 214 (1874).
29Cf. Phillips v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 283 U. S. 589 (1931); Murray v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, U. S. 306 (1885) ; Attorney General v. Jochim, 99 Mich.
358, 371 (1894); The Generous, 2 Dod. 323 (Eng. 1818); McKean, The Law of Necessity, 36
Dickinson Law Rev. 237 (1932).
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apply the regulatory police powers of the state, care should be taken to enjoin
upon such tribunal the observance of a certain course of procedure as well as
proper rules of decision in the performance of its proper functions.30 As repeat-
edly pointed out in the course of this article, delegation of primary legislative
power is ultra vires. Moreover, if it appears, that the limits of authority are too
broad, an attempted delegation of power to an administrative body would be
treated as a nullity."' The essential statutory limitations upon administrative
authority should be such as assure official performance of delegated duties within
"bounds that are consistent with the fundamentals of individual liberty and
private property;- 3 2 "conformable to the language of the statutes conferring
power and responsibility;" ' and observant of the requirements of fair dealing.
84
In other words, strike a just and lawful balance between public and private
rights. At this point it is submitted that no orders, rules, regulations, adjudica-
tions or determinations promulgated by governmental authorities should be
1. Beyond the power constitutionally exercisable.
2. Out-side the limits prescribed by statute, or
3. Based upon a mistake of law.
It seems almost unnecessary to suggest that rules and regulations laid down
by an administrative body should not only be consistent with the standards and
requirements imposed by statutory enactment, but in addition, such rules and
regulations should furnish an appropriate and efficient means of carrying out
the policy of pertinent legislation. Wherever possible, such rules should resemble
statutes in so far as they should lye given a reasonable, fair and prospective inter-
pretation; but this principle of interpretation is, as intimated, only presumptive
in both cases.
In order to ensure the efficient and expeditious discharge by administrative
boards and commissions of the important governmental duties delegated to them
by legislative bodies, it is incumbent upon the latter to fix primary standards as
a goal;3 6 they may then, if they deem proper, confer upon! the former, full power
and authority to fill up the details by the formulation of useful rules and regu-
lations.36 While it is true that these powers are subject to abuse, the teachings
of experience support the conclusion that it is advisable to leave something to the
judgment and discretion of administrative officials by empowering them to ac-
complish in detail, that which is authorized or required by law expressed in
30Wichita R. R. & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 260 U. S. 48 (1922); State v.
Great Northern Ry., 100 Minn. 445, 111 N. W. 289 (1907).
1lHolgate Bros. Co. v. Bashore, 331 Pa. 255 (1938).
S2Ownebey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94i 110, 111 (1921).
33 Board of Education v. Rice (1911) A. C. 179-L. J. K. B. 796.
814Local Government Board v. Arlidge, (1915) A. C. 120-8 L. J. K. B. 72.
S5 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
86United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 577 (1902).
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general terms.37 Such being the case, it is not at all surprising to read in the
reports that authority delegated by statute to a board or commission to make
rules and regulations in order to carry out the administrative purpose of an
enactment, is not void as a vesting of legislative discretion.3 8 Further than this,
the general trend of the-authorities is to the effect that wherever an adminis-
trative agency adopts a rule or regulation reasonably adapted to the enforce-
ment of a statute, the administration of which has been entrusted to it, such
mandates or precepts have the force and effect of law, if not in contravention
of express statute, or violative of constitutional provision. 9 On the other hand,
we should ever be mindful of "the ancient right unnoticed as the air we breathe,"
that such instructions are limited in their efficacy by the fundamental principle
of Anglo-Saxon systems of jurisprudence, that the rights of man are to be
determined by the law itself, "Not by the let or leave of bureaus." For it can-
not be gainsaid that "arbitrary power and the rule of the Constitution cannot
both exist," as was clearly shown by the United States Supreme Court in the case
of Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission.40 In almost every paragraph
of this article it may be observed that two questions present themselves as having
a direct bearing upon the validity of administrative proceedings. The first of
these deals with the legality of the power exercised. The second question is con-
cerned with the requirements of due process. It is submitted that the reason-
ableness and appropriateness of the means employed to attain a governmental
objective is an important factor in weighing questions of administrative due
process. Oddly enough, it is sometimes found necessary for appellate courts to
explain that official regulation by an administrative body does not amount to the
general powers of ownership." 1 Mistakes of such a character are ordinarily the
outcome of inexperience rather than of highhandedness; and are seldom per-
petrated by veteran civil servants. In general there are numerous governmental
usages and practices so firmly established by common experience as to constitute
due process of law, and be implied as such in American constitutions.' 2 This
characteristic feature of American law is in line with an important canon of
interpretation of the language of American constitutions to the effect that resort
may be had to the common law of England, and its history, as aids to elucidation. 48
371Red "'C" Oil Manufacturing Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 222 U. S. 380 (1914) ; Petition
of State ex rel. Attorney General and others, 220 Wis. 25 (1936).38
Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commission, 297 U. S. 129 (1936); First National
Bank v. Attorney General, 244 U. S. 416 (1918); State v. Normland, 76 N. H. 541 (1913).
3
9
Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 342 (1926); United States v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 234 U. S. 476 (1913) ; Morrill v, Jones, 106 U. S. 466 (1885).
40298 U. S. 1 (1936).
41State v. Public Service Commission, 262 U. S. 276 (1923); Public Utilities Conmission v.
Springfield Gas & Electric Co., 291 Ill. 209 (1920).
4
2
Ponderous text-books entitled "Due Process of Law," embody much valuable information on
the validity of governmental usages.
43Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 161 (1925); Ex parte Swartwout, 4 Cr. 93 (U. S. 1807);
Wulzen v. Board of Supervisors, 101 Calif. 15 (1894), semble; Jacksonville v. Bowden, 67 Fla.
176 (1914), semble; Attorney General v. Jochim, 99 Mich. 368 (1894).
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ORDERS AND ADJUDICATIONS
It is noticeable that the authority which administrative boards and com-
missions possess to make official rules and regulations, extends to the making of
orders and adjudications. Specifically it is not a delegation of legislative powers,
for a law-enacting body to vest an executive officer, an administrative board,
commission or other governmental agency, with authority to find facts and make
orders consistent with the statutory standards imposed by legislative enactment.
44
Conversely, it is logical and inevitable that an administrative order or adjudica-
tion out of harmony with statutory authority would be deemed a nullity. Legal
standards must be observed, and should not be violated or neglected by irre-
sponsible, arbitrary or capricious conduct on the part of any functionary in an
English-speaking community. Reasonable application of delegated power should
be the first consideration of administrative agencies. It is generally taken for
granted that such is the case, consequently the familiar presumption that public
officers, is in all likelihood conducive to the rule of the common law that an
order of a board or commission is ordinarily dealt with as prima facie evidence
that the proceedings resulting therein were conducted in accordance with law.'
6
For the most part an administrative order has recognized finality."6 Unless:
1. Issued beyond the limits of power which it could constitutionally
exercise.'
7
2. Overstepping the limits of statutory authority.'
8
3. Lacking sufficient sustaining evidence.'
9
4. Based upon a mistake of law. 50
Ideal administrative adjudication would be fair and reasonable; and not only
rest upon lawful authority but in addition be supported by rational and
credible evidence. At all times when the jurisdictional problem arises, whether
a statute is intended to establish a rule of law, and thus define the duty of a
tribunal, or is meant to limit its power, the solution of such difficulties is a matter
of construction and common sense."' It is interesting to note that the prerogative
writs which have played an important part in the development of the common
law of England, have been derived from administrative orders.
5 2
4 4
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433 (1939) ; Holgate Bros. Co. v. Bashore, 331 Pa. 255 (1938);
Rohrer v. Milk Control Board, 322 Pa. 257 (1930); Commonwealth v. Benn, 284 Pa. 421 (1925).4 5
Scranton v. Public Service Commission, 80 Pa. Super. 549 (1923); Jenkins Township v.
Public Service Commission, 65 Pa. Super. 122 (1916).
46Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 575, 586 (1942).
4"St. Joseph's Stock Yard v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 (1936); Crowell v. Benson, 285
U. S. 22 (1932); Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920).
48Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194 (1912),
49 Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Commerce Commission, 335 Ill. 624 (1929). Its
investigation should not be too narrowly constrained by technical rules as to the admission of
proof. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25 (1904).
5 0Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 222 U. S. 541 (1922).
51Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230 (1908).
6 2 Plucknet, A Concise History of the Common Law (2d ed.) 156 (1936).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
EVIDENCE
It goes without saying that findings of fact are of great moment in admin-
istrative jurisprudence. Although a statute may make such findings by a board
or other governmental agency conclusive,53 a finding of fact where there is no
competent legal evidence whatever to support it, is an error of law; 54 and such
an error is in substance a denial of due process. 55 In general, findings of fact
bear a close analogy to those of a chancellor (originally an administrative officer),
in that they have the force and effect of a verdict, they should not be disturbed
if there is adequate, competent evidence to support such conclusions of fact. 6
At the same time it must not be overlooked that conclusions bearing upon juris-
dictional facts raise questions of law, and consequently may be re-examined
by legal tribunals.5 7
Caustic critics have characterized naby rules of evidence of common law
jurisdictions as "admirably adapted to the exclusion of truth." However this may
be, it should be freely acknowledged that many rules of evidence are funda-
mentally adversary, and insofaras they are the peculiar product of the jury sys-
tem may be regarded as inapplicable to the administrative process. Consequently
it has been decided that administrative tribunals are not bound by the stringent
rules of evidence which obtain between private parties such as strict corres-
pondence between allegation and proof.58 Nevertheless it should not be over-
looked that "the rule of substantial evidence is one of fundamental importance
and is the dividing line between law and arbitrary power."59 And furthermore
substantial evidence does not support an administrative finding where the con-
clusion drawn therefrom is arbitrary or confiscatory.6 0 A rational basis for a
finding is substantial evidence; 61 and if it is ample to sustain findings of fact,
the latter are regarded as conclusive.6 2 In other words, "the factual approach" of
non-judicial tribunals is not clogged by obstructive technicalities such as those
illustrated in M. D. Post's "Stranige Schemes of Randolph Mason." At the same
time there is, and should be, no hesitation on the part of the courts to reverse
administrative findings which are not sustained by 'substantial evidence.63  And
5 3
Poluskiewscz v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 257 Pa. 305 (1917).
5
4
United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co,, 265 U. S. 274, 289 (1924); McCauley v. Im-
perial Woolen Co., 261 Pa. 312. 319 (1918).5
6Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Department of Public Works, 268 U. S. (1925).
56 Compare: Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 245 U. S. 463 (1918).
5 7 1nterstate Commerce Commission v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 216 U. S. 518 (1910).5 SInterstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, note (49) supra.
69National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products Inc., 97 F (2d) 13, 15 (C. C. A. 6th
1938).
60Denver Union Stockyards Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 470 (1938); St.* Joseph's Stock
Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 51 (1936).
6lUnited States v. Lowden, 308 U. S. 225 (1939); Rochester Telephone Co. v. United States,
307 U. S. 125, 146; Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U. S. 28 (1934).6 2
Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. United States, 245 U. S, 463 (1918).6
3National Labor Relations Board v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 319 U. S. 206 (1940); Na.
tional Labor Relations Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U. S. 292 (1932).
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in addition to the type of shortcoming just particularized, the failure or omission
of an administrative agency to take into consideration factors and circumstances
which a judicial tribunal conceives should be taken in to account and weighed
with care, is in like manner regarded as legal error, and may lead to a reversal
of an administrative order. 64 Further than this, it is almost elementary in Ameri-
can jurisprudence, that even a legislative body lacks constitutional pow/r to
make a determination by an administrative tribunal so decisive and conclusive
as to bar an appropriate review by a judicial tribunal of a finding made without
evidence to support it."6 William Penn's maxim that power without justice is
tyranny seems pointedly applicable in questions of administrative procedure.
Accordingly, it is not to be overlooked that a refusal to receive important addi-
tional testimony offered without undue delay, is not only unreasonable and
arbitrary, but in addition, a flagrant abuse of discretion." Stated axiomatically,
an administrative agency's conclusions of fact should not be reviewed by a
court, except where such findings violate a law of the land. For the most part
questions relating to te admissibility and weight of evidence in executive or
administrative proceedings, should be measured by the standard requirements of
constitutional law and usage, and not by blind adherence to precedents which
have originated in cases of trial by jury. At this juncture, it may be considered
worth while to remark, that it has not been found feasible, in the course of
working on this article, to isolate or segregate the subject-matter of the several
topics touched upon, so as to preclude frequent recurrence of accompanying,
component, or modificatory principles, necessarily and almost unavoidably em-
ployed in the process of clarifying or completing a statement of propositions
under discussion. For this reason there may be found in the course of this ar-
ticle many re-appearances of what a casual reader might consider uncalled for
repetitious material. Returning to a consideration of the topic of evidence, it is
manifest that much of the law on that subject, so far as it pertains to inquisi-
torial procedure, is mainly concerned with questions of its relevancy and ma-
teriality from the yiew-point of the legitimate requirements of delegated au-
thority. In other words, "an official inquisition to compel disclosure of fact is
not an end, but a means to an end, and it is a mere truism to say that the end
must be a legitimate one to justify the means.'' 67 Ends or goals of attempted
judicial or administrative inquisition which have been universally adjudged
illegitimate in American jurisdictions, include
1. Compulsory self-accusation.6 8
64
1nterstate Commerce Commission v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 315 U. S. 373
(1942); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 235 (1931); Illinois Central Railway Co.
Ct al. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 206 U. S. 441 (1907).
85Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920).
6
6Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197 (1938).
67Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U. S., 1, 25-6 (1936).
68United States Constitution, fifth Amendment; and, by necessary implication, Fourteenth
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2. Unlawful searches and seizures.69
3. Unlawful inquisitorial investigation, i. e. where the interests ot
justice do not require it.7
0
4. Divulging of privileged communications; which is a very narrow
field, in common law countries.
71
5. Betrayal of secrets of state.
72
6. Unfair admission of hearsay. 73  McKelvey's masterly elucidation
of the general rule against hearsay may be profitably quoted at
this point. It is as follows:
Statements, oral or written, made by persons not parties to the suit, and not
witnesses therein, are not admissible to prove the truth of the facts stated, except
in two classes of cases:
(a) Where they are rendered necessary by the difficulty of other proof.
(b) Where the circumstances under which they are made furnish some
guaranty of their reliability, other than the mere fact of their having
been made.
7. Findings made without affording adequate opportunity for a suf-
ficient hearing.
7"
8. Arbitrary, oppressive or tyrannical control. 75
Stated affirmatively, whenever an administrative board or commission has
accorded a fair hearing, has made proper findings of fact, and has met all
applicable statutory requirements, the courts are powerless to intervene, in the
absence of a clear showing showing that the limit of due process has been over-
stepped. 76 In a word, this resolves into two questions, existence of power and
due process in its exercise. Ordinarily all that is required of administrative
Amendment, Section 1.69 Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Company, 264 U. S. (1924).
70Huessener v. Fishel & Marks Co., 281 Pa. 535 (1924). This and similar legal errors could be
avoided by scrupulously taking care to keep questionings within reasonable bounds as to time con-
sumed and range of inquiry (See 2 Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, 2d ed.) p. 1087.
7115 Jones, Commentaries on Evidence (2d ed.) p. 4236.
' 2 Appeal of Hartranft, 85 Pa. 433 (1877),
'tSEngelbretson v. Industrial Commission,- 151 Pac. 421 (Calif. 1915); Baker v. Freed, 138
Pa. Super. 315 (1940).
't4Acker v. United States, 298 U. S. 426 (1936) ; Southern Ry. Co. v. Commission, 290 U. S.
190 (1933); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241 (1907).
7
5 West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U. S. 622 (1935); Public Service Commission
v. Great Northern Utilities Co., 289 U. S. 130 (1933); Interstate Commerce Commissioh v. Louis-
ville & Nashville Co., 227 U. S. 88 (1912); Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N. Y. 435
(1916); McCauley v. Imperial Woolen Co., 261 Pa. 312 (1918).
"t6Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Co., 315 U. S. 575, 586 (1942); Sunshine An-
thracite Co. v. Adkin, 310 U. S! 381 (1940); Florida v. United States, 292 U. S. 1, 12 (1934);
Public Service Commission v. Great Northern Utilities Co., 289 U. S. 130 (1933); New York v.
Public Commission, 245 U. S. 345 (1917).
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agencies is competent and conscientious discharge of official duty. It is almost
superfluous to observe, that in the absence of prejudicial error, findings made
where there is sufficient competent testimony to support them in convincing
fashion, will receive judicial approval.
PRECEDENTS
The old saying that "hard cases make bad law," which is at the basis ot
the familiar stare decisis maxim of the common law, does not apply to the deci-
sions of administrative agencies. Such non-judicial tribunals, (whose orders have
been described as in the nature of mandatory injunctions), are expected to decide
cases on their merits; provided always that such decisions be liable to court re-
view, in proper cases, where the scope of delegated -authority and power, or the
lagality of exercise thereof be questioned. Or, as recently expressed by the
United States Supreme Court, "Determination of what is 'fair and equitable'
(in a statute) calls for the application of ethical standards to particular sets of
facts. But these standards are not static. In evolving standards of fairness and
equity a board or commission is not bound by any settled judicial precedents." 77
As a rule, "the function of an administrative body is to get something done. * * *
It must seek a practical solution for one case rather than a rule for all cases." 78
Even handed justice and equity in the widest sense of the word is what is called
for by these authorities. While courts of law may be held down to observance
of the ancient rule that "the law will rather suffer a particular mischief than
a general inconvenience;"719 it is, as previously suggested, not incumbent upon
non-judicial tribunals to feel themselves fettered by such a doctrine. On the
contrary, in the words of the learned Alexander Stephens:
"The great object of Government should be * * * to secure the greatest
possible good to every-member of society, without INJURY to any. No ninety-
nine persons, whatever, have any natural right to advance their interest or good,
by inflicting an uncompensated injury to the hundredth, or in any other pro-
portion." 80
IMPEDIMENTS TO INJECTING CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Questions of constitutionality may be raised by parties in interest only;8'
and even then only where essential to the determination of a case.8 2 Irrelevancies
are not favored in British or American jurisdictions. Promptness in the assertion
of constitutional rights is very important, for it is well settled that such rights
7 7
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenerny Corporation, 318 U. S. 80, 89 (1943).7 8
Dickinson, "Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law," 235 (1927).
7 9
Cox v. Rolt, 2 Wils. K. B. 253 (Eng. 1764).
8016 American Bar Association Journal 331 (1930).
81State v. Becker, 328 Mo. 541 (1931).
8 2
McKean, Border Lines of Judicial Power, 48 Dickinson Law Review, (1943).
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may be forfeited by failure to make timely assertion thereof before a tribunal
having jurisdiction to determine them.83 It may be recalled, parenthetically,
that no board or other administrative tribunal is the final arbiter of its own juris-
diction.8 4 To hold otherwise would be to violate the basic rule of Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence that questions of power are for the judiciary, and that any admin-
istrative conclusions as to jurisdictional facts may be examined by legal tri-
bunals.85 Another elementary principle of American and English law, sometimes
overlooked or forgotten, is the important rule that an administrative body can-
not lawfully add to or subtract from the- terms of a legislative enactment under
which it makes its rulings.8 '
CONCLUSION
In closing this dissertation, attention is invited to the increasing number
and growing importance of administrative agencies. The prestige and service-
ability of these governmental instrumentalities largely depend upon the char-
acter and ability of their members; and it goes without saying that anything
which has a tendency to impair the efficiency and weaken the morale of admin-
istrative officers, is a menace to the cause of good government. These almost
platitudinous comments would be unnecessary, were it not obvious to the most
casual student of partisan political expedients, that it sometimes comes to pass,
that a chief executive contrives to gain control of appointive administrative
boards and commissions, by procuring undated letters of 'resignation from his
several nominees, as a condition precedent to their induction. This species
of political finesse may be forestalled by legislation creating quasi-legislative
or quasi-judicial agencies independent of executive control.8 7
88Yakim v. United States, 64 S. Ct. 660 (1944); Southern Ry. Co. v. King, 217 U. S. 524
(1910); O'Neil v. State of Vermont, 144 U. S. 323 (1892).
841nterstate Commerce Commission v. Humboldt Steamship Co., 147 U. S. 165 (1893).8 5 nterstate Commerce Commission v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 216 U. S. 518.
86United States v. Standard Brewery Inc., 251 U. S. 210, 220 (1920) ; Mayo v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 112 N. Car. 343 (1893) : Bacon v. Boston & Maine R. R., 83 Vt. 421 (1910).
87Rathbun v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935).
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